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Abstract. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis on the income inequalities 
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correction model.  
 
Keywords: credit, error correction model, European Union, income inequality, panel.  
 
JEL Classification: C33, D63, E51.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical and Applied Economics
Volume XXIV (2017), No. 2(611), Summer, pp. 61-74
Ionuț Jianu 
	
62 
1. Introduction 
The financial crisis has questioned the financial sector's role in the development and 
growth process and its impact on income distribution. National governments considered 
that the banking system is too big to fail and, finally, guaranteed for the banking sector 
debt with government bonds to save it, subsequently transforming private debt into 
public debt. Indeed, the world could not pass through this stage without as 
policymakers choosing a compromise between the financial and the social one. Most of 
the research papers developed in this area have demonstrated that national governments 
opted for a compromise that has deepened the social imbalances in the world. The 
theory says that an exaggerated level of lending has the ability to increase the 
economy's vulnerability to shocks and to cause imbalances on the distribution of credit, 
which may affect the income gap, as individuals with low income will not benefit from 
the same opportunities as those of individuals with high income.  
In 2014, the private sector credit - expressed as a share of gross domestic product 
(GDP) - from the first 15 European Union member states (EU-15) increased by 58.22% 
compared to the level recorded in 1995, while Gini index (relevant indicator for income 
inequality) fell by 0.32% on the same timeframe. Although, on average, income 
inequality is considerably lower in 2014 than it level from 1995, this indicator had an 
extremely heterogeneous evolution in the EU-15 Member States, its evolution being 
influenced by other factors, which were integrated into the research. 
The trend of income inequality is considered a result of the indicators evolution related 
to economic growth, social, education and health spending, financialisation, corruption 
and national institutional features, unemployment, investment, tax burden, economic 
openness, technological progress, price level, as well as energy capture by human 
activity and information processing. 
The motivation for choosing this theme lies in the academic interest for income 
inequality area and its constant presence in the agenda of economic debates, 
respectively the social discontent against the capitalist system reforms.  
The main goal of the paper is to estimate the impact of private sector lending on income 
inequalities, it following to be achieved by reaching three specific objectives: 
 identifying the impact of private sector lending and other relevant factors that have 
the ability to impact the income inequality; 
 testing the Gauss-Markov theorem hypotheses; 
 performing the economic analysis of the obtained results. 
 
2. Literature review 
The results of researches whose goal consisted in estimating the impact of financial 
development on income inequality, are quite ambiguous and often contradictory. Galor 
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and Moav (2004) proved that credit growth leads to a decrease in income inequalities 
level, given the fact that credit growth give the opportunity to the lower class to borrow 
and start new projects, which can reduce the income gap. On the other hand, Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) showed that in countries with weak institutions, there is a positive 
relationship between financial development and income inequality, considering that 
individuals with high incomes have a privileged position in terms of access to finance. 
According to Law et al. (2014), financial development could represent a driver force of 
income inequalities reduction, in the case of prevailing strong institutions, which allows 
individuals of the lower-class to invest in human capital. 
Clarke et al. (2006) and Beck et al. (2007) identified a positive relationship between 
financial development and the gap between incomes, while Jauch and Watzka (2012) 
found a positive impact of credit growth on income inequality, using a panel data with 
fixed effects for 138 countries. 
Jaumotte et al. (2013) analysed the concept of income inequality as a consequence of 
financial and trade globalization. The analysis included private lending as a share of 
GDP on the control variables list, the corresponding coefficient for this variable being 
positive and statistically significant. Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) analysed the financial 
development and its overwhelming influence on increasing income disparities in the 
1980-2012 period in 97 states and have reached similar conclusions. 
According to Piketty (2014), financial expansion can lead to an increase in income 
inequality because of its statistical association with wealth increase, the last one being 
distributed more unevenly than the incomes. Also, Li and Yu (2014) estimated the 
impact of lending as a share of GDP on income inequality (expressed in Gini indicator), 
identifying a significant and positive coefficient of it. Moreover, Denk and Cournède 
(2015) analysed a sample of 33 OECD countries and proved that the existence of a  
high degree of financialisation coincides with a situation where income disparities 
prevailing the national state. According to them, the expansion of financial creates the 
premises of income inequalities increase, given that economic entities with high profits 
can receive larger loans than the ones of individuals or economic entities with low 
incomes, leading to a higher return on investment for high profits economic operators, 
which leads to wage increases. Furthermore, de Haan and Sturm (2016) identified a 
positive impact of financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises on 
income inequality, the effect being conditioned by the features of political institutions. 
The selection of the private sector credit as a relevant variable to capture the impact of 
finances on income inequality came from the hypothesis demonstrated by Naceur and 
Zhang (2016), according to which its effect is manifested mainly through the banking 
sector, but not through the stock market capitalization. 
Testing the relationship between credit and income inequality has raised new questions 
concerning the manifestation of the endogeneity between inequality and lending. Most 
of the existing research in this field, such as those of Rajan (2010) or Kumhof (2015) 
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showed that loan growth may be a consequence of the growing gap between incomes, 
taking into consideration the fact that individuals who get low incomes start borrowing 
to avoid consumerist disparities against the upper class. Also, Gu and Huang (2014) 
confirmed this hypothesis. Van Treeck (2014) found that the financial crisis in the 
United States (2007-2008) was caused by the increase of the income gap, following the 
same economic foundation mentioned above. On the other hand, the literature review 
provides conflicting views of the authors too. Atkinson and Morelli (2011), respectively 
Bordo and Meissner (2012) did not identify any significant impact of income inequality 
on the credit cycle. However, the literature is not conclusive on the assumption of this 
hypothesis. Most of the papers from this field examined the relationship between 
financial liberalization and income inequality, as well as that of Claessens and Perotti 
(2007) saying that extractive institutions continue to favor a rent-seeking behavior. 
 
3. Methodology 
The main objective of the paper is to estimate the impact of private sector lending on 
income inequalities in the EU-15. In this context, I used the quantitative approach, 
deductive method and certain specific econometric techniques. 
In order to investigate the stated objective, I estimated the impact of private sector 
lending growth and other control variables (listed in Annex 1) on income inequalities – 
in Eviews 9.0 software – using panel technique and generalized error correction model, 
implicitly the Generalized Least Squares method (the estimation being weighted with 
the Cross-Section SUR option). 
Data series were extracted on yearly basis, covering the 1995-2014 period for the first 
15 Member States of the European Union. I chose this representation of the panel data, 
because these countries were member states of the European Union on the entire period 
of analysis, thereby, the research not being affected by the adhesion of other countries 
to the union. Statistical database used did not cover the entire time horizon analysed for 
the Gini coefficient and lending to the private sector (expressed as a percentage of 
GDP), which made it necessary running the linear interpolation tool of Eviews, in order 
to estimate the missing data from the analysis (Annex 2 and Annex 3). 
Following the verification of the stationarity and of the residuals, it has resulted the use 
of error correction model as the most accurate method for estimation. In order to 
confirm the econometric method used, I checked the stationarity test using the 
Summary window, a technique that provides results for each of the 5 tests applied for 
unit root(1) assumption and Hadri, in exceptional cases. However, the impact analysis of 
the exogenous variables on a single endogenous variables and the non-stationary nature 
of the initial variables (becoming stationary after performing the first difference) 
indicated selecting error correction model as the most appropriate estimation method, 
eliminating the vector error correction model from the possible alternatives. The 
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selected method requires adding the error term lagged by 1 time-series frequency 
(resulting from the estimated model using the initial variables), its specific coefficient 
having the role to estimate the speed of adjustment. Error correction model can be 
applied only if the error term is stationary, a situation that indicates a long-term 
relationship between regressors and regressand. 
Even if the panel is considered a more effective technique because it increases the 
number of degrees of freedom and the estimation efficiency, it can also bring new 
challenges, regarding the autocorrelation between cross-sections. In this respect, I used 
Cross-Section SUR option to correct, ex-ante, the possible inconveniences of the 
model. 
After including the interpolated data, the first differences of the variables and the 
appropriate lag in the model, it has resulted 270 observations of the 300 initial 
observations (15 cross-sections). Regarding the selection of the appropriate lag, I used 
the Schwarz information criterion for each of the first four lags (Schwarz has the 
smallest value for lag 1, concluding that choosing lag 1 is appropriate).   
Identifying the optimal lag, the differentiation level, and the estimation method, has 
made it possible the estimation of the following model: 
ܦሺܩ݅݊݅ሻ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܦሺܩ݅݊݅௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߙଶܦሺܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݌௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߙଷܦሺ݄݁௧ିଵሻ ൅ 
൅	ߙସܦሺ݁݀௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߙହܦሺݑ݊௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߙ଺ܦሺݐܽݔ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߙ଻ܦሺܥܲܫሻ ൅ 
൅	ߙ଼ܦሺ݋݌݁݊݊݁ݏݏሻ ൅ ߙଽܦሺ݂݂݃ܿሻ ൅ ߙଵ଴ሺܷ ௧ܶିଵሻ ൅ ߝ௧                                         (1) 
where:  
ܦሺܩ݅݊݅ሻ  and ܦሺܩ݅݊݅௧ିଵሻ  catch the first difference of Gini coefficient and the first 
difference of its auto-regressive term, while ܦሺܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݌௧ିଵሻ , ܦሺ݄݁௧ିଵሻ , ܦሺ݁݀௧ିଵሻ , 
ܦሺݑ݊௧ିଵሻ, ܦሺݐܽݔ௧ିଵሻ represents the first difference of the following variables lagged 
by one year: private sector credit as a share of GDP, government health expenditures as 
a share of GDP, government education expenditures as a share of GDP, unemployment 
rate, respectively total tax burden as a share of GDP (including imputed social security 
contributions). On the other hand, ܦሺܥܲܫሻ, ܦሺ݋݌݁݊݊݁ݏݏሻand ܦሺ݂݂݃ܿሻ correspond to 
the dynamic of the corruption perception index, trade openness and gross fixed capital 
formation. Finally, the last component of the model is ܷ ௧ܶିଵ – the error term laged by 
one year – respectively ߝ௧, this series being estimated in order to indicate the residuals 
distribution.  
After estimating the model, I checked the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theorem to 
confirm or reject that the estimators are best linear unbiased estimators. Thereby, I used 
the verification of the following hypotheses by the methods mentioned-below at a 
significance threshold of 5%: 
 linearity of the model; 
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 the confirmation of the significance of the parameters and non-zero dispersion for 
each regressor (T-test and standard error); 
 the existence of a number of observations greater than the number of coefficients;  
 the absence of the multicolinearity, the test being performed by using Klein criterion 
- the absence of the multicolinearity is confirmed when the correlation coefficient 
between two exogenous variables is less than the coefficient of determination;  
 the absence of correlation between regressors and residuals (Pearson correlation);  
 the confirmation of the errors features, according to which their average is null and 
the residuals are normally distributed (Jarque-Bera test and histogram of the 
residuals); 
 the confirmation of the errors features, according to which their variance is constant 
(the existence of the homoskedasticity – White test); 
 the absence of cross-sections dependence (Breusch-Pagan and Pesaran test); 
 the confirmation of the hypothesis, according to which conditional average of the 
errors is null (Residuals plot).  
4. Results and interpretations 
This section examines the impact of private sector credit on the evolution of income 
inequality, as well as investigates the validity of the model.  
Initially, I checked the stationarity of the variables using the tests mentioned in 
methodology to identify the appropriate procedure for estimating the model. The tests 
performed indicated the non-stationary character of the variables, these becoming 
stationary after processing the first difference (Table 1). 
Table 1. Stationarity tests – Summary window 
Variable 
Number of tests rejecting I(0) unit root 
hypothesis (α = 5%) 
Number of tests rejecting I(1) unit root 
hypothesis (α = 5%) 
Individual 
intercept 
Individual 
intercept and 
trend 
None Individual intercept 
Individual 
intercept and 
trend 
None 
Gini* 1 of 4 5 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 5 of 5 3 of 3 
Gini(-1)*  1 of 4 4 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 5 of 5 3 of 3 
creditp(-1)* 3 of 4 2 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 4 of 5 3 of 3 
he(-1) 0 of 4 2 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 5 of 5 3 of 3 
ed(-1)  1 of 4 2 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 5 of 5 3 of 3 
un(- 
1) 2 of 4 0 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 5 of 5 3 of 3 
tax(-1) 0 of 4 0 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 5 of 5 3 of 3 
CPI* 2 of 4 3 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 5 of 5 3 of 3 
openness* 1 of 4 5 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 5 of 5 3 of 3 
gfcf 0 of 4 1 of 5 0 of 3 4 of 4 5 of 5 3 of 3 
*Hadri test rejects the stationarity hypothesis at level and accepts it after processing the first difference. 
Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
The use of error correction model involves adding in the regression the variables specific 
to first differences, as well as of the error term, this process being conditioned of its 
stationary character. In this respect, I checked and confirmed the error term stationarity 
using the same procedure mentioned above (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Error term stationarity 
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Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
Next, I estimated the model by the Generalized Least Squares method (Cross-Section 
SUR option), the obtained results being attached in the Annex 4. Their analysis indicates 
a coefficient of determination of 0.8093, confirming the linearity of the regression and the 
proper selection of the regressors, given that the exogenous variables evolution explains 
80.93% of the fluctuation of the regressand. Also, the probability of the F-test (0%) 
confirmed the validity of the model in statistical terms. Following that, I analysed the 
impact of the regressors, respecting the „ceteris paribus” assumption. 
According to the results attached in Annex 4, the increase of autoregresive term with 1 
deviation point led to an increase in the dynamic of the Gini coefficient with 0.899 points. 
The impact can be caused by the ability of the savings to generate new additional 
revenues for the population that records high-incomes, which may increase the spread 
between wage incomes. 
Regarding the subject of interest of the paper, the model has estimated an impact of 
0.005 points on the dynamics of Gini index at an increase with 1 percentage point of 
credit to private sector as a share of GDP – lagged by one year in the EU-15. This effect 
results from approving, in particular, of loans to companies with high turnovers, this 
type of loan being less risky. Subsequently, these economic entities increase their 
profits by adopting and applying certain development strategies (as a result of accessing 
the credited amounts), which can lead to an increase in wages, increasing the disparities 
between employees working in a company with low profits and low access to credit and 
those who operate in a company with high profits and high access to credit. Another 
explanation lies in the effect of the credit growth on the rise of asset prices, implicitly 
on investors wealth. 
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The control variables used have contributed significantly to the fluctuation of income 
inequality. The increase by 1 percentage point in the dynamics of government spending 
on health (as % of GDP) and government spending on education (as % of GDP) – 
variables lagged by one year – reduced the dynamic of Gini coefficient with 0.104 and 
0.139 points, the explanation of the phenomenon being given by the theory of human 
capital. On the other hand, the 1 percentage point growth in the dynamics of 
unemployment rate from the previous year has led to an increase in the dynamic of 
income disparities from the current year with 0.063 points, this relationship being argued 
by the impact of reducing the number of employees in the economy (implicitly that of the 
transition from wages to income from unemployment benefits - which are lower than 
wage incomes) on income gap. Regarding the impact of the tax burden on Gini index, an 
increase in its dynamics (variable lagged by 1 year) by 1 percentage point grew the spread 
between incomes with 0.045 points. 
The variables included in the model that are impacting the Gini coefficient on short term 
(corresponding to the situation where there is no lag) are the level of corruption, openness 
of the economy and gross fixed capital formation. In this respect, the increase of the 
dynamic of corruption perception index by 1 deviation point (which shows a decrease in 
the level of corruption, considering the reverse scaling of the indicator) had an effect of 
–0.029 on the dynamics of Gini index, influence that could be argued by multiple channels 
of impact, such as: the impact of corruption on economic growth and, implicitly on income 
inequality, the impact of corruption on tax evasion, ineffective tax administration and on the 
deductions through social groups benefits disproportionately, the effect of corruption on 
reducing the efficiency of social programs or the impact of corporate lobbies on the 
policymaking process, due to the high concentration of property assets in the economy. 
Regarding the impact of the openness of the economy on the income inequalities, the 
increase of the dynamic of the trade openness by 1 percentage point led to a decrease of 
income inequality dynamics with 0.019 points, the effect having the ability to manifest 
through the influence of trade on economic growth channel, which reduce the Gini 
coefficient, as well as that of the impact of trade openness on the expansion of certain 
market sectors.   
On the other hand, the increase of gross fixed capital formation dynamic with  
1 percentage point increase the dynamic of Gini index with 0.081 deviation points.  
If all the variables are constant, the dynamic of the gap between incomes feels a growth with 
0.060 points. Taking into account the long-run relationship between regressors and 
regressand, I have found that the annual speed of adjustment of the disequilibriums was 
1.122%, this coefficient being statistically valid, given that it satisfies the condition of the 
negative sign and its statistically significant coefficient.   
The estimated coefficients for each exogenous variable are significant at a significance 
threshold of 1%, excepting the first differences of government spending on education 
coefficient, a variable that is statistically significant for the 5% threshold, but not for the 
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1%. Also, the standard errors of the estimators is non-zero, but close to 0, which confirms 
the second hypothesis of the Gauss-Markov theorem, while relatively high population 
size (the third hypothesis) creates the premises for a proper representation of the 
residuals.  
Table 2 shows that there is no multicolinearity between the regressors used in the 
analysis, taking into account that the coefficient of determination is higher than the 
statistical correlation coefficient between the exogenous variables.  
Table 2. Klein criterion – testing multicollinearity 
Correlation matrix 
of 1st difference Gini* cred* he* ed* un* tax* CPI open gfcf 
Gini* 1.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.00 
cred* 0.03 1.00 0.14 0.11 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 
he* 0.01 0.14 1.00 0.45 0.14 -0.18 0.05 -0.08 -0.24 
ed* 0.02 0.11 0.45 1.00 0.23 -0.03 0.04 -0.07 -0.23 
un* -0.03 -0.09 0.14 0.23 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.14 -0.40 
tax* 0.00 -0.02 -0.18 -0.03 0.01 1.00 0.05 0.02 0.18 
CPI 0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 1.00 0.07 0.03 
open -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.07 1.00 0.16 
gfcf 0.00 -0.08 -0.24 -0.23 -0.40 0.18 0.03 0.16 1.00 
R-squared = 0.8093; open is openness and cred is creditp; * are the regressors lagged by 1 year.  
Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
On the other hand, the Table 3 confirms the hypothesis concerning the absence of 
correlation between regressors and residuals, which validates other two hypothesis of 
Gauss-Markov theorem.  
Table 3. Correlation matrix between residuals and regressors 
Correlation matrix* Gini** cred** he** ed** un** tax** CPI open gfcf 
Residuals -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
*Regressors are expressed in 1st difference form; ** are the regressors lagged by 1 year.   
Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
According to the result of Jarque-Bera test (Table 4), there are no arguments to reject the 
hypothesis related to normal distribution of errors, since its probability-value (0.186) is 
above the threshold of 5% used. At the same time, the average of the residuals is null, 
making it possible the investigation of the following hypotheses. After using White test, I 
have accepted the hypothesis that the model is homoskedastic, given that the product of 
the number of observations and R-squared (218.515) is lower than Chi-square statistic 
(296.466) for 258 degrees of freedom. Also, Breusch-Pagan LM (1.000) and Pesaran CD 
(0.863) tests confirm the absence of cross-sections dependence, since their probability is 
higher than the significance threshold of 5%. 
Table 4. Residuals hypothesis 
Hypothesis Method Result 
Normal distribution of residuals Jarque-Bera 0.186 
Homoskedasticity White-test 218.515 
Cross-section dependence absence Breusch-Pagan LM 1.000 
Cross-section dependence absence Pesaran CD 0.863 
Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
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Regarding the verification of the zero conditional mean of the errors, I used the Residuals 
plot to check the constancy of residuals. Figure 2 demonstrates the constant evolution of the 
residuals (blue line), around 0. Thereby, I have accepted the hypothesis related to zero 
conditional mean of the errors and afterwards, I have validated the model - the estimators 
being characterised by maximum verisimilitude.  
Figure 2. Actual, fitted, residual plot 
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Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
In other words, the model has fulfilled all the conditions for a correct statistical 
representation and its expected effects can be considered very close to the current reality. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper estimated a positive impact of private sector credit growth on income 
inequality, this being caused by the existence of disequilibriums in the distribution of the 
credit. The coefficient is statistically significant and the model meets all Gauss-Markov 
theorem assumptions, necessary to the validation of the maximum verisimilitude of the 
estimators. Moreover, there is a long-run relationship between the exogenous variables of 
the model and the Gini coefficient. Also, this research demonstrated that the income 
inequality has a historical cause. The proper conduct of macro-prudential policy can 
provide a solution in terms of moderating the impact of excessive lending to the private 
sector on the income inequalities. 
 
 
Note 
 
(1)  See Levin, Lin and Chu (i), Breitung (ii), Im, Pesaran and Shin (iii), ADF-Fisher (iv), PP-Fisher (v). 
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Annex 1. Data used 
Indicators Source 
GINI coefficient Eurostat and OECD 
Private sector credit (as a % of GDP) World Bank 
Health government expenditures (as a % of GDP) Eurostat 
Education government expenditures (as a % of GDP) Eurostat 
Unemployment rate (%) International Monetary Fund 
Total tax burden including imputed social security contributions - total 
economy (as a % of GDP) AMECO 
Corruption perception index Transparency International 
Total trade (as a % of GDP) - openness index Eurostat 
Fixed gross capital formation (as a % of GDP) Eurostat 
Source: Own processing. 
 
Annex 2. Gini coefficient interpolated data 
Country Interpolated data for Gini coefficient (years) Gini coefficient  values 
Austria 2002 25.70 
Belgium 2002 28.15 
Denmark 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 20.00, 20.50, 21.50, 23.40 
Finland 2003 25.75 
France 2003 27.60 
Germany 2002, 2003, 2004 25.28, 25.55, 25.83 
Greece 2002 33.85 
Ireland 2002 29.80 
Italy 2002, 2003 30.30, 31.60 
Luxembourg 2002 27.30 
Netherlands 2003, 2004 26.97, 27.93 
Portugal 2002, 2003 37.27, 37.53 
Spain 2003 31.00 
Sweden 2003 23.00 
United Kingdom 2004 34.30 
Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
 
Annex 3. Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) interpolated data 
Country Interpolated data for credit to private sector (years) Credit to private sector     (% of GDP) values 
Austria 1998, 1999, 2000 97.61, 95.04.92.46 
Belgium 1998, 1999, 2000 72.01, 69.99, 67.96 
Denmark No data missing No data missing 
Finland 1999, 2000 51.14, 51.93 
France 1998, 1999, 2000 79.02, 78.23, 77.45 
Germany 1999, 2000 112.87, 112.46 
Greece No data missing No data missing 
Ireland 1999, 2000 80.90, 76.39 
Italy 1999, 2000 57.32, 58.96 
Luxembourg 1998, 1999, 2000 86.03, 83.91, 81.77 
Netherlands 1998, 1999, 2000 101.47, 104.87, 108.27 
Portugal 1999, 2000 97.27, 106.12 
Spain 1999, 2000 86.99, 91.06 
Sweden No data missing No data missing 
United Kingdom No data missing No data missing 
Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
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Annex 4. Model estimation 
 Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0	
 
